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THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS. By Charles Grove· 
Haines. New York: Russell & Russell, Inc. 1965. Pp. xiii, 388. $8.50. 
Jurisprudence, that subdivision of legal thought relating to the 
problem of determining what constitutes "law," has attracted the 
attention of more people within the past two decades than ever be-
fore. Law professors, law students, and those engaged in the practice 
of law, as well as persons one would not ordinarily believe to be 
interested in the underlying concepts of state-prescribed norms of 
conduct, are seeking an understanding of the basic nature of our 
legal system. 
Many factors have brought about this comparatively widespread 
interest in the underpinnings of our law. Part of this "fundamentals 
of law" orientation can be traced to the ever-expanding role played 
by law in American society during the second half of the twentieth 
century. Regulations prepared and administered by government are 
constantly touching more aspects of day-to-day life. The points of 
contact between individual action and legal mandates have been 
steadily increasing in number for several decades. In addition, the 
intensity of the clashes between individual actions and the com-
mands of the law has tended to increase in magnitude. As more 
Americans have been subjected to legal restraints, their desire to 
learn more about the basic characteristics of the law has quite under-
standably been stimulated. The increased dissemination of knowl-
edge resulting from an unprecedented quantum of formal education 
has triggered what might be viewed as a chain-reaction response in 
many Americans-the desire for more and more information about 
their 01vn society and each of its component parts. For this reason, 
commentators are paying more and more attention to the basic 
factors which shape the principles of law expounded by the legisla-
tive, executive, and judicial branches of government. 
Warranting special attention in this trend is the proliferation 
of material written by political scientists engaged in exploring the 
techniques and processes employed by judges in arriving at deci-
sions.1 These authors have stressed that in many instances the judge 
does not confine himself to the demands of precedent and the 
technical merits of the contentions urged by the litigants. Instead, 
he may pay attention, in varying degrees, to how the available 
alternatives would affect the relations. between the branches of the 
government, as well as how those alternatives relate to national and 
1. For an excellent discussion of the techniques employed by some Justices of the 
United States Supreme Court to gain support for their personal positions from their 
brethren on the Court, see MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964). The ap• 
proach to law as a balancing of power positions between the different sectors of federal 
and state government is vigorously presented in SHAPIRO, LAw AND POLITICS IN THE . 
SUPREME CoURT (1964). . 
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personal objectives and standards as understood and accepted by 
the judge. Economics, social organization, and political philosophy 
often not only influence a court's thinking but also may be the 
determinative factors in its ultimate decision. 
The Revival of Natural Law Concepts, by Charles Grove Haines, 
probes the history, content, and application of natural-law concepts 
from ancient times through the 1920's. One who has been looking 
for a clear, succinct, and well considered examination of the various 
facets of natural-law philosophy will certainly regard this book as 
a "find." Many authors have struggled to present a clear description 
of the component elements of natural-law thought but have missed 
the mark. Mr. Haines has scored a direct hit. He successfully captures 
and conveys to the reader the chameleon nature of natural law, 
discussing its changing character since its initial appearance in early 
Greek thought. Carefully and with a strong hand, the author guides 
the reader through the shifts in emphasis, objectives, and manner 
of application expounded by the proponents of natural law. Haines 
thus contributes to the reader's appreciation of the fact that legal 
systems do more than simply adjust grievances among individuals. 
The norms of conduct administered by the law-makers reflect man's 
groping for a body of rules which he can use as a measuring rod to 
ascertain the propriety of his acts; this urge to seek out a body of 
basic standards is the crux of natural-law philosophy. By the time 
one completes his reading of this volume, he cannot contest the 
conclusion of the editors of the Harvard Studies in Jurisprudence 
that this work has well earned a place in that esteemed collection 
of writings devoted to the examination of legal philosophy. 
What is natural law and where does it come from? What are its 
directives and how has it been applied? When compared with other 
legal philosophies, how has it fared? In what way has it been used 
to shape the development of American law and how much influence, 
if any, will natural-law concepts have on the future content of 
American law? Each of these questions is studied in The Revival of 
Natural Law Concepts. 
Some Greek and some Roman philosophers placed "law" into nvo 
categories. One was man-made law-those norms established by 
human beings for use at a particular time and place. Not all of man's 
"laws," however, were to be treated in the same fashion. Some were 
to be respected while others were to be rejected. The second category 
was the frame of reference for determining the propriety or impro-
priety of mankind's prescribed standards of conduct; in other words, 
a superior body of rules determining right and wrong. This higher 
law, according to natural-law theory, circumscribes man's law-mak-
ing power. It provides the guidelines which fallible mankind is 
obliged to observe. Under this conceptT those norms formulated by 
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men which violate such superior mandates are not to be treated as 
law. State directives which fail to comply with basic standards of 
correctness are not "law" and need not be obeyed. 
During the Greek and Roman period, the natural-law theory 
was invoked as a rationale by those who were dissatisfied with the ex-
isting order. Indeed, throughout subsequent history it has been used 
repeatedly by the malcontents, the proponents of change, the alien-
ated-to employ the current nomenclature used by the existentialist 
thinkers and their progeny to depict those who reject what society 
has to offer. "Out-groups" have insisted time after time that there 
is a higher body of law than that laid down by mankind and that 
higher law entitles them to gain entrance to, or replace, the "in-
groups." However, this is just one aspect of the manner in which 
natural-law thinking may be utilized. It has also been employed to 
inject into existing law the kind of elasticity essential to the efficient 
and acceptable functioning of a nation's legal system. It has served 
as an escape tube through which legal concepts can be eliminated 
when they become unsatisfactory. Conversely, it has been invoked 
to establish or retain certain economic, political, and· social concepts 
which, although favored by the law-makers, are in need of a 
philosophical foundation upon which they can be sustained. 
Advocates of the natural-law theory do not always agree with one 
another as to the source of natural-law principles. Some take the 
position that there are certain divinely created directives which 
govern human conduct and which are immutable as well as universal. 
Others approach natural law by de-emphasizing, or even omitting 
all reference to, a supreme being. They stress man's power to reason 
logically and to observe his environment. All of these concepts 
converge on the premise that one need only look about him to 
discern the basic standards of proper human conduct. Some natural-
law theorists rely upon theological literature, some concern them-
selves with the manner in which events take place, and others find 
the basic standards of propriety in the presumed desiderata of man-
kind.2 The common characteristic of each of these branches of 
natural-law philosophy is the subjective manner of determining the 
content of natural law. This subjectivity has permitted the sup-
porters of natural-law philosophy to urge different results simulta-
neously. For instance, some advocates of individual liberty have 
urged that individuals should be permitted to pursue their personal 
goals with a minimum of governmental intervention. Others have 
insisted that only by the government's playing an active part in the 
functioning of society will individuals be abkto enjoy the freedom 
2. A well reasoned argument for support of this philosophy of law is the underlying 
theme of FULLER, Tm: MORALITY OF LAw (1~64). 
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essential to the pursuit of their aspirations. Both of these theories 
have been supported on the basis of natural law. 
The chapters in this book which will probably have the greatest 
attraction for the constitutional-law enthusiast are those which ex-
plore the role that natural law has played in the development of the 
doctrine of judicial review. The author finds an application of 
natural-law theory in the principle that the judiciary possesses the 
power to oversee, within certain self-imposed limits, the activities 
of the legislative and executive branches of the government with a 
view to determining whether their acts violate a constitutional 
mandate. Haines exposes the reader to a fascinating exposition of 
the history of constitutionalism-the doctrine that there is a higher 
law in reference to which the judiciary can competently and right-
fully determine the enforceability of laws devised by men. The 
Magna Carta, Lord Coke's opinion in Doctor Bonham's Case,3 in 
which that jurist insisted that the standards of conduct ordained by 
the king as well as by Parliament were subject to a higher law, and 
Blackstone's assertion that there was a superior law are each, in 
the author's opinion, illustrative of the natural-law approach to 
man-made law. 
Supporters of the American Revolution boldly asserted that it 
was correct, by the tenets of a higher, unwritten law, for the colonists 
to seek their freedom from the mother country. These men were 
influenced by the concept of natural law; they insisted that a higher 
law granted individuals certain rights which no human being ( even 
a king), or any collective body of human beings, such as Parliament, 
could deny. It is not surprising that Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, 
having been exposed to this philosophy, grasped the opportunity in 
Marbury v. Madison4 to assert that the Constitution vested in the 
judiciary the power to determine the validity of congressional legis-
lation. That assertion was clearly consistent with the belief of the 
leaders of the Revolution that the Constitution of the new republic 
acknowledged the concept of a higher law. In the place of a higher 
unwritten law, Marshall concluded, the Constitution itself had been 
selected as the basic frame of reference which the judiciary was 
obligated to use in determining whether governmental action was 
lawful. 
During the course of the nineteenth century, the breadth of 
acceptance of natural-law thinking waxed and waned. The concept 
of inalienable rights, which had played such a prominent role in 
3. 8 Co. Rep. 114, 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (C.P. 1610). Coke's insistence on the supremacy 
of a higher law, which was to be applied by the judiciary to invalidate certain acts of 
the king and parliament, did not become a part of the English constitutional system, 
Instead, under English law, the parliament is supreme. Sec generally Mortensen v. 
Peters, 8 Sess. Cas. (5th Ser.) 93 (Scot. Ct, Justiciary 1906). 
4. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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rallying the people to storm the Bastille and reject the French 
monarchy, all but disappeared in France after the revolution had 
run its course. As the battle lines slowly formed in the United 
States between the antagonists representing the conflicting attitudes 
of the North and the South, there was a resurgence of concern with 
natural law and inalienable rights. Those who urged that the 
southern states had a right to secede from the Union appealed to 
"states' rights," a doctrine based upon a "higher law." Abolitionists 
insisted that the institution of slavery was wrong in the very nature 
of things and had to be extinguished. The assertion that the Union 
was supreme indicates strongly a rejection of the higher-law philoso-
phy so vehemently asserted in the l 770's as a rationale for the 
American Revolution. 
Following the Civil War, the natural-law concept merged with 
the economic theory of laissez-faire to give rise to an approach to 
constitutional law which dominated the American scene for many 
decades. This was the political-economic concept that the due 
process clauses contained in the Constitution severely restricted the 
power of the federal and state legislatures to regulate contract and 
property rights. Mr. Haines expounds at great length upon the 
period he refers to as "conservative"-the period when the Supreme 
Court struck down statutes directed at curbing individual activity 
viewed by many as deleterious to the best interests of the nation. 
Laws subjecting private action to public regulation were considered 
by "conservative" members of the Court to be violative of the liberty 
guaranteed to individuals by the Constitution. 
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, many of those who 
concerned themselves with the meaning of law and the obligations 
of the members of society to observe the commands of the state 
turned away from natural law and looked to other bases of law 
which appeared to them to be more consistent with the milieu of 
the age. Those who espoused the "positivist" approach rejected the 
idea of a higher unwritten law, and instead defined law narrowly 
to embrace only those mandates proclaimed by the state. What the 
state commanded was law; what the state did not command, insisted 
the positivists, was not law. The content of the law was clear-cut and 
easily discernible. The state was the sole and final arbiter of right 
and ·wrong.5 Like the positivists, the followers of the "historical" 
school of law denied the existence of universally appropriate rules 
of human conduct. They insisted that the content of the law of each 
nation was unique to that entity, being predicated upon the 
5. Mr. Haines presents the positions of Kant and Hegel with regard to the 
supremacy of the state at pp. 237-38. For a critique of the positivist school, as well as an 
argument that natural law is• essential if excesses of power are to be avoided, see 
SHUMAN, LEGAL POSITIVISM (1963). 
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characteristics of its people, such as their collective past experiences 
and their aspirations. 6 
Positivism, rather than natural law, took hold in many areas of 
the law in the early part of the twentieth century. The author 
places the objectives of those who fought for the revival of natural 
law in the twentieth century into four categories: (I) to infuse into 
the law ethical concepts which law-makers might othenvise omit; 
(2) to provide law-givers with a sense of direction toward the attain-
ment of sought-after ideals; (3) to have judges and legislators 
acknowledge the existence of a body of laws superior to any which 
they might personally select; and (4) to place some outermost limits 
on state action. 
Natural law has attracted many ardent followers since the 1930's. 
Following World War II, the victorious powers revolted from "posi-
tivism run rampant," which characterized the Hitler regime, and 
invoked natural-law concepts in their decision to conduct the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo trials. An examination of the judicial 
opinions pertaining to these proceedings quite clearly indicates that 
an idea of a "higher law" set the tone for the trial and conviction 
of those who had led the Axis cause.7 The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, adopted by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations on December 10, 1948, clearly embraces natural-law at-
titudes.8 The decisions of our own Supreme Court since the early 
1950's in such matters as civil rights,0 the rights of those accused 
of crimes,10 and representation of the electorate in the federal and 
state legislatures11 illustrate an attitude that law is based on some 
standards of propriety beyond any specific precedents or mandates 
of carefully drawn statutes; these standards may even be contrary to 
some of the wishes of many members of the community. 
One cannot help coming away from reading The Revival of 
Natural Law Concepts with a feeling that he has substantially bene-
fited from an excellent exposure to one of the basic components of 
current legal philosophy. The materials contained in this book 
assist one to become quickly attuned to judicial decision-making in 
the 1960's. It has long been recognized that even the most primitive 
6. A discussion of the basic precepts of the historical school appears at pp. 68-70. In 
Haines' opinion "the historical school of jurisprudence set about to destroy all vestiges 
of the ideas of natural law or natural rights." Id. at 70. Historical jurisprudence is 
dealt with at length in NoRTIIROP, THE COMPLEXITY OF LEGAL AND ETHICAL ExPERIENCE 
(1959). 
7. See The Niirnberg Trial 1946, 6 F.R.D. 69 (1946); In re Yamashita, 827 U.S. 1 
(1946). 
8. U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. R.Ec. 8d Sess., Resolutions 7l(A/810) (1948), 
9. E.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 847 U.S. 488 (1954). 
10. E.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
11. E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 58~ (1964) (state apportionment); Wesberry v. 
Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (congressional districting). 
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social organizations utilize law as a tool to mold the kind of social 
organization that the members of the group-at least those who 
possess the power to make policy--desire. However, of more recent 
vintage is the widespread willingness of many people to use the law 
as a technique of formulating new norms of conduct rather than 
simply as an instrument to reinforce pre-existing doctrines. When 
analyzed at some distant time in the future, the present epoch may 
very well be referred to as the "Age of Law." Students, professors, 
Ia-wyers, and laymen alike can gain an excellent insight into one of 
the guiding forces of this era by reading Mr. Haines' volume. For 
those who tend to shy away from books devoted to an examination 
of legal philosophy, I am happy to report that the undesirable 
characteristics frequently found in books dealing with this sector of 
the law are entirely lacking in this well-documented and readily 
comprehensible work. Those who plan to read this volume have an 
enjoyable and enlightening adventure ahead of them. I suggest 
that the attractive and well-marked journey through The Revival of 
Natural Law Concepts be started at once. 
Edwin W. Tucker, 
Associate Professor of 
Business Administration, 
The University of Connecticut 
